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Introduction 
 
The basic idea of securitization theory (ST) is that actors can bring about 
securitization by presenting something as an existential threat and by dramatising 
an issue as having absolute or very strong priority.1 There are two main readings of 
ST. To some extent they stem from two opposing views of what a theory (of 
securitization) can and should do; but they also reflect metatheoretical differences, 
being united only in their ambivalence about the possibility of anticipating the 
future in a meaningful and rational way.2 The first, usually associated with post-
structuralism, focuses on language and more specifically on the speech act of 
securitization and its constitutive effects.3 The dramatic effect of the post-
structuralist ST lies in the implicit denial of the reality of threats. 
 
The second, more conventionally sociological approach analyzes the social process of 
securitization in terms of facilitating conditions, authority of the speaker and the 
complex social field within which securitization occurs. This approach does not deny 
that threats and dangers can be real, but its critical intent focuses on showing the 
impact of social conditions and relations that may distort, or even generate ex nihilo, 
representations of external dangers and threats.4 
 
In this paper, I try to go beyond these approaches by absenting the absences in ST, 
namely the future as something that is real but not yet (fully) determined and (ii) the 
possibility of structural transformations. True, there is a sense in which the future 
and future threats are present in the post-structuralist version of the theory. Future 
dangers understood through the modern probability calculus are seen as constitutive 
of security-talk. Reality is socially constructed. While probability and claims about 
the future are may in this way be seen as real in constituting present practices, key 
works such as Barry Buzan’s, Ole Wæver’s and Jaap De Wilde’s Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis are open to different readings on the question whether 
future dangers, threats and risks can themselves be real.5 
 
The main argument in favour of relativism about security claims is that future 
security problems can only be meaningfully discussed if precise scientific predictions 
are possible. Predictions presuppose a closed, mechanical, and deterministic 
system. There are passages in Security: A New Framework and other works, 
however, that seem closer to traditional forms of materialist political realism, 
implying that threats and future possibilities can be real and foreseeable.6 But 
because of this 
ambivalence, only little work has been done in thematising future dangers 
as something real in themselves, not to speak of assessing their likelihood. 
 
Similarly, structural transformations do play a limited role in securitization theory. 
Especially the sociological perspective can illuminate the possible effects of institutional 
changes, but it tends to direct attention to domestic structures only. Whenever ST 
takes into account and thematises the interactions of securitizing states, it resembles 
the “crude realist thinking about the balance of power, where the national security 
concerns of states A, B, C, D, etc. interact with each other on the basis of materialist 
calculations of threat”7. ST tends to assume a given structural setting and is interested 
only in the dynamics of interactions within this setting. 
 
In some formulations, it allows for regional integration processes to make a 
difference by creating conditions for a pluralist security community, but mostly ST 
focuses on interactions among states in a states-system, understood in terms of 
political realism and British institutionalism. In contrast, in this paper I argue that 
real future dangers can be absented by transforming structures, including global 
political economy structures. This presupposes we can plausibly analyze possible and 
likely futures also in open-systemic, non-mechanical and non-deterministic contexts. 
 
 
 
Modern probability calculus as constitutive of the concept of security  
 
As a social mechanism, securitization is characterized by a fairly mechanical pattern 
between security-talk and particular kinds of responses to it. One can express this 
basic pattern of securitization by means of a simple if-then sentence: if {a, b, c} ...., 
 
then securitization happens, and with it the defined effects {x, y, z}, typically 
involving some exceptional measures.8 In other words, security talk is triggered 
by something, and once triggered by this something, it brings about certain de-
democratising or militarising effects in a rather mechanical fashion. 
 
The sociological approach insists that securitization requires a complex setting of 
social relations to work. However, also the sociological approach must assume 
that the use of the word “security” has potential to generate the defined effects, 
even though mere speech-act by someone somewhere is not sufficient for 
securitization to occur. Where does the power of security-talk come from? 
 
A conception of security as oriented towards future dangers emerged with the 
European modernity.9 While collective violence has been a problem across the 
world, and while questions about military dangers and opportunities have been 
pondered and debated at least since the first millennium BC, security could not have 
been defined in terms of risks of future contingencies before the emergence of the 
concept of mathematical probability.10 Gradually, the concept of security became 
prominent in three apparently disconnected fields. The first is that of “social 
security”. All people have faced the uncertainties brought on by illness, disability, 
maternity, death and old age, as well as by other eventualities such as bad weather. 
Since the late 19th century, pushed by the rise of the labour movement and its   
demands, states have developed policies against these and more modern 
uncertainties such as unemployment, typically in terms of social insurances (by this  
time, private insurances were already a large-scale industry). Secondly, in the US  
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, “securities” were defined as any transaction that 
involves an investment of money in an enterprise, directly or indirectly, with an 
expectation of future profits – implying, however, a risk of loss – to be earned 
through the efforts of someone other than the investor. Thirdly, the concept of 
“national security” emerged as the official guiding principle of foreign policy in the 
US when President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act on 26 July 1947. 
 
The theory of securitization presupposes these 20th century meanings connected 
with the word “security”, constituted by the modern probability calculus and 
concept of risk that can be traced back to the 17th century. According to Ian Hacking, 
the modern concept of probability that emerged in the 1660s had a dual meaning: it 
had to do with both a degree of belief and stable frequencies.11 The former, comes 
close to meaning “approvable as a basis for action”, whereas the latter entails 
theories about calculating likelihoods, as well as testing hypotheses, in terms of 
infinite sequences of occurrences of something. The latter presupposes stable 
frequencies, in turn closely associated with the Humean regularity view of causation. 
 
Risk can be defined in terms of probability (P) and the value of loss (VL): risk R = P x 
VL. Modern security is about avoiding risks, concerning explicitly the future. A 
future loss can be imagined and then a probability attached to it. Given the 20th 
century practices of insurance, securities exchange, and national security, a claim 
about potential future loss, misfortune or catastrophe is framed as a risk, which in 
the context of national (state, homeland) security has regularly generated de-
democratising or militarising responses. Logically, however, an attempt at 
securitization must be based on two claims, concerning (i) a danger that lies in the 
future and which may materialize with probability p and (ii) the best way to respond 
to that danger. But how do we know whether claim (i) is true? Moreover, from a 
normative point of view, there is no automatic link from (i) to any particular (ii).  
 
Ontologically, the future is real but not yet (fully) determined. Future is an 
increasingly shaped and structured possibility of becoming, mediated by the 
presence of the past. As Roy Bhaskar maintains, “the future is paradigmatically 
shaped possibility of becoming” that, as a possibility, “may be closer or more distant 
from us, more or less about, and more or less likely to be actualized”12. The 
question for critical security studies is: how can we assess claims about the future, 
which, reflexively, involve also likely consequences of one’s own actions? 
 
Action is always future-oriented and requires some knowledge about likely 
consequences. The concept of probability is thus indispensable for comparing 
anticipations in terms of whether they can provide an approvable as a basis for 
 action. It is, however, possible to redefine probability in a way that detaches it from 
those modern cognitive and social forms, which have been intertwined with 
particular forms of mathematics (system of numbers, arithmetic, algebra and 
probability calculus) and practices and institutions of capitalist market society. 
 
Importantly, John Maynard Keynes in his Treatise on Probability revived the older, 
practical meaning of the term probability.13 Keynes’ theory was a synthesis between 
the belief and frequencies approaches, stemming from an attempt to find a basis for 
ethical actions. For Keynes, relative frequencies are only a type of relevant evidence 
and in many situations, they are not available. Probabilities are not necessarily 
numerical and sometimes cannot even be compared. Probability concerns an inference 
from evidence/reasons to our probability-judgements. The weight of evidence does not 
necessarily change our probability-estimate but may alter our confidence in it. Learning 
more about the situation can mean that our ignorance increases, implying that the 
weight of evidence and confidence may in fact decrease.14 Probability-judgements are 
thus necessarily complex and multi-layered. 
 
To this Keynesian theory may be added a dialogical understanding about assessing 
probability judgements. Different actors, although all perfectly reasonable and having 
the same evidence e, may yet have different degrees of belief in p.15 The disagreement 
is not the end of the story, however. The problem of assigning different degrees of 
belief in, or having different probability estimates of, p can become a topic in a rational 
cognitive controversy that follows the dialectical logic of formal disputations.16 Each 
dialectical step may also involve further research into the matter, accommodating new 
pieces of evidence and new geo-historical experiences. Furthermore, although the 
majority of relevant probabilities in historical social sciences may be non-numerical, we 
can nonetheless use the basic Bayesian theorem as a heuristic tool to assess the 
reasonable impact of an occurrence of new evidence or historical turns, i.e. to analyze 
how we should change estimates and beliefs.17 
 
The point is that the likelihood of different possible futures can be assessed 
rationally. Therefore it may be quite sensible to present something as an existential 
threat or even dramatize an issue as having a strong priority. And yet, often these 
kinds of claims are exaggerated, unfounded or misleading. The scenarios may not be 
plausible or there is over-confidence in one’s probability judgement, given the 
openness of social systems, nature of available evidence, and our degree of 
ignorance. Since world history unfolds in relatively open systems and is often 
sensitive to small changes in some conditions, anticipations of possible futures are 
contingent on a number of uncertain things: multifarious geo-historical processes 
and mechanisms (including homeostatic causal loops), and the modes of 
responsiveness of actors, which are linked to layered systems of collective learning 
and self-regulation.18 Through modes of responsiveness and mechanisms of 
learning, actors’ expectations and anticipations are in fact an essential part of geo-
historical processes. Scenarios may, and often do, lack critical self-reflexivity, even 
though prophecies can be self-fulfilling or self-denying – sometimes on purpose.19 
 
Reflecting upon these uncertainties, feedback loops and relative openness of the 
future, the construction of scenarios about possible futures has also a moral aspect. 
Furthermore, even when a particular future danger is not only real but also likely, it 
is not evident what the best way to respond to that danger is. The choice of 
adequate response is an ethico-political question par excellence. Hence, instead of 
merely describing a quasi-mechanical pattern between modern security-talk and 
typical responses to it,20 the main purpose of critical security studies should be to 
cultivate better ways of discussing the future and dangers that may lie in the future.  
 
 
 
Avoiding future dangers in terms of structural transformations 
 
The modern probability calculus and related forms of insurance and security are 
constitutive of the prevailing geo-historical modes of responsiveness. A causally 
efficacious intervention shaping those background meanings and related modes of 
responsiveness may undo, and thus absent, the social mechanism of securitization. It 
should be stressed, however, that modern security-talk is not the only possible path 
towards de-democratisation, militarisation or potentially violent conflicts.21 
 
Critical security studies can do more than avoid reification and provide a dialectical 
comment on the geo-historical constitution of securitization.22 The reproduction or 
transformation of the conditions of social action presupposes manifold and layered 
social structures and implies power as transformative capacity. The term “social 
structure” refers to internal and external relations of a positioned practice. As social 
scientists, we are not only interested in internal but also external social relations; 
not only in constitution but also in causation. 
 
Thus what matters – apart from the framings and narratives available to an 
organization given the formative context – are the concrete mechanisms of choice, 
which select and frame issues and amalgamate stories about possible and likely 
futures. This is what the sociological approach to ST is good at. It can shed light on 
how securitization is shaped by the speaker’s authority and his or her causally 
relevant audiences; on how particular contextual circumstances can trigger or 
reinforce securitization and render the relevant audience more sensitive to its 
vulnerability; and how securitization can occur in various fields of struggles.23 
 
What is lacking in all forms of ST, however, is an account how the relevant contextual 
circumstances and structural relations of power stem from the dynamics of global 
political economy. Characteristically, the contextual circumstances that may trigger or 
reinforce securitization and render relevant audiences more sensitive to their 
vulnerability have to do with economic growth, levels and terms of (un)employment, 
socio-economic uncertainty, distribution of income, and effects of commodification. The 
lack of adequate politico-economic responses may even result in a spiral of downward 
developments involving escalation of conflicts and, potentially, war. 
 Asymmetrical relations of power can shape and generate securitization. For instance, 
actors positioned in the practices of corporations, political parties and states may be 
intra- or trans-related for instance through simultaneous or successive positioning of 
individual actors; or interrelated through relations of financial (inter)dependency; or 
both, also through systems of industrial and technological planning. These kinds of 
power-relations condition the selection and framing of issues on the agenda, 
possibly involving securitization. Another example is the possibility that international 
financial institutes or the structural power of transnational capital constrains states’ 
economic policies in counterproductive ways, thereby making large segments of 
relevant audiences in many countries more sensitive to their vulnerability. 
 
Moreover, under circumstances characterised by a continuing and possibly deepening 
downward trend in the world economy, unfavourable terms of trade, financial crises, as 
well as population growth and environmental problems, several states may ‘fail’ or 
collapse. Thus, because of global political economy developments, wars fought in the 
global south may expand and/or become more frequent. 
 
These kinds of insights have long been known to various Liberal, Keynesian and 
Marxian political economists. Many of them have advocated structural and 
institutional changes in line with their theoretical understandings, such as more 
democratic state structures and open world economy; more capable, fair and 
democratic regimes of co-operation and systems of global governance; and 
institutional arrangements that would enable going beyond the possibilities 
and constraints set by contemporary liberal-capitalist world economy.24 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The theory of securitization has only limited explanatory power, even assuming 
continuity of the formative background. It can be helpful in analysing some aspects 
of processes that are relevant to understanding the social conditions of peace, 
conflict and security, but it has little to say about wider geo-historical processes. In 
other words, securitization theory (ST) is no more than an ideal-typical model of a 
particular and limited-scale social mechanism. It can do significant explanatory 
work only in the context of wider geo-historical theories and explanations. 
 
From an Alkerian perspective25 ST can usefully be read as an attempt to uncover 
the practical grammars and deeper conceptual logic of action making part icular 
outcomes possible.26 These logics – constituted by modern concepts of probability 
and risk – can be changed. They are debatable and re-negotiable. By revising the 
concept of probability and by introducing critical reflexivity to scenario-building, it is 
possible to provide better means for discussing future dangers. 
 
In other words, ST encourages one to be critically reflexive about one’s anticipations 
about the future and how they are used in actions and practices. While future 
 dangers and their likelihood can be assessed intersubjectively, they may also be co-
generated by grammars and meanings internal to modern security practices. In 
particular, modern probability theory tends to be a rather misleading basis for 
reasonable probability-estimates about future possibilities. There are no non-
contextual and stable frequencies, which could provide the basis for an ‘objective’ 
probability. The more unique the relevant historical trajectories are, the more 
uncertainty tends to prevail. Under uncertainty, learning more about the overall 
complex situation and about the relevant factors can mean that the weight of 
evidence and our confidence in the original probability estimate in fact decreases. 
The crux of this line of ethico-political argumentation can be summarized as a rule of 
action: the more ignorant we are about the likely consequences of our own actions, 
the more we should stress the role of generalizable virtues and norms and avoid 
undue securitization, because securitization tends to imply secrecy, violation of 
legitimate norms and procedures, and thus de-democratization. A process of 
interacting securitizations can also create enemies and make war conceivable. 
 
It is possible to shape the circumstances and structural conditions of action, including  
those structural conditions and asymmetric relations of power that can make undue 
securitization easier. In this paper, I have especially emphasised the importance of 
global political economy processes in co-determining the potential for securitization 
as well as for opening other possible paths towards de-democratisation, 
militarisation or potentially violent conflicts. Unwanted sources of causal 
determination can be absented through structural and institutional changes, even 
though transformations tend to have unintended consequence too. That is, also 
changes towards more functional and legitimate systems of governance or 
government require rational knowledge about possible and likely futures. 
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